Introduction
'Territory' has now become a key concept in geography and space planning. Though it may appear as a polysemous if not a blanket term, territory is generally defined as a socially demarcated, appropriated space that is marked by the play of stakeholders and authorities at all scales (Moine, 2006; Sack, 1997) . Specifically, a territory is indissociable from the question of land, as land consists in a finite resource which is appropriated and subject to competition (Elden, 2010) . The distribution of land, the pressure bearing on it and plot division are closely affected by returns on production, by land use and by population pressure (Chaléard and Mesclier, 2010) .
However, it is rare to address a territory at a smaller scale, that of the plot, and this is the scale used here. Focus is on a large irrigated rice production system, Perimeter PC15
Marianina Valley, that forms part of the large Malagasy 'rice granary', the Lake Alaotra basin (Raunet, 1984) (Figure 1 ). The perimeter seems basically ambivalent. Although it is presented as the most efficient perimeter in the region for both water control and paddy rice yields (average 4 t/ha) (Devèze et al., 2003) , a number of questions have been raised with regard to the sustainability of the irrigation system (Belloncle et al., 2002; Fujiki, 2013; Fujiki et al., 2014) . The supposed efficiency of the irrigation network contributes to the attractiveness of the perimeter and further accentuates the already high population and landholding pressure throughout the region (Garin, 1998) . This ambivalence echoes the international context marked by the calling into question of large hydraulic projects, with these being accused of wasting water (Perry et al., 2009) , causing various ecological constraints and finally representing substantial economic costs (Jamin et al., 2011; Turral et al., 2010) .
The research problematics addressed here are based on identifying and explaining the landholding dynamics of the perimeter and the territorial strategies used by rice growers in the area covered by the irrigation network. A twin hypothesis is put forward: first, in largescale quantitative analysis the hyper-fragmentation of land is significant throughout the perimeter, forming the ultra-dominant dynamics; second, more detailed local analysis reveals very varied and divergent territorial strategies from the abandoning of non-viable 3 plots by farmer-legatees to the systematic purchase of land by newly arrived persons and some of the largest landowners.
It is easy to explain the interest of the subject and two reasons can be put forward.
First, the scale of the plot is the scale of the lives of farmers, the users of the irrigation system. The 'territory' concept has its full significance at this scale as the latter forms the real foundation of development of the perimeter and, beyond this, the drainage basin.
Interventions by the state, by the manager of the perimeter and by donors concerning the management of the irrigation and drainage system are made in an extremely complex land tenure framework in which common law and modern law (Droy, 1994; Evers et al., 2006) , and consolidated and allocated lands (Bouderbala et al., 1992) are mingled. This framework features a very dense, changing field layout that forms the base for relations and also efforts to get the upper hand between owner users and developers. The plot pattern is also the basis for relations between persons in the context of an agrarian society marked by the power of land. Land forms economic power (today, rice fields are often still the main source of household income) (Carimentrand, 2011) , symbolic power (rice is still a crop that bears prestige and is central to Malagasy identity and myths), a heritage (farmers aim at passing on their land-intact or enlarged-to their children) (Funel et al., 1985) and political power (the plot layout is the basis for client relations between managers/large landowners and clients/tenant farmers) (Blanc-Pamard, 1987) .
Secondly, in the face of landholding pressure that is particularly strong for irrigated land in sub-Saharan Africa, with the increase in micro-plots (Blanc-Pamard and Cambrézy, 1995; Bouderbala et al., 1992) , the literature has been focused above all on the interest of landholding security and the role of property and tenure on agricultural intensification (Bellemare, 2013; De Janvry et al., 2001; Lavigne Delville, 1998; Le Roy et al., 1996) . Land fragmentation is relatively left aside and often reduced to just one factor among others in agricultural productivity. It is essential here to note that a specific definition of land fragmentation has been retained for this paper. In our study area, land consolidation occurred in the late 1960s, and land 'lots' were attributed to each farmer, according to the following principle: for each lot, a single owner-operator, a single holding (holding is understood in this paper as land ownership) and a single hydraulic unit. This principle did not stand for long: indeed, those lots were then divided into plots over the years: this is what is 4 meant here by land fragmentation. Many authors define land fragmentation as the division of holdings into several plots that are dispersed over a large area but farmed as single units (King and Burton, 1982; Manjunatha et al., 2013; Niroula and Thapa, 2005) . In this paper, land fragmentation should hence on the contrary be understood as the simple division of lots into plots over time (plots with possibly different owners). Nonetheless, if a same lot may today be divided into several plots, some holdings may extend in the same way over several lots, as some rich owners do not hesitate to buy scattered plots over the perimeter.
Here, stress is laid on a detailed, mapped study of fragmentation in order to observe the precise implications of the phenomenon on the management of a perimeter from both the socio-institutional and hydraulic angles.
A description of the historico-geographic context of the perimeter is followed by details of the methodology and then the results of the research.
5 Figure 1 . The Lake Alaotra basin (Data: BVLac).
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The context
The Lake Alaotra region became Madagascar's large rice production centre in the twentieth century and now accounts for 1/8 of national production (Carimentrand, 2011) .
However, the history of land development operations illustrates the partial failure of the policies applied in the region.
Lake Alaotra region: Madagascar's large rice granary
The Lake Alaotra basin is in the Malagasy highlands. The tropical humid climate is tempered by altitude (average inter-annual precipitation 1000 to 1250 mm, 90% of which is from November to March) (Garin, 1998; Teyssier, 1994) . The region is remarkable for both the environment and its rice production. The basin benefits from protection of the wetlands by virtue of the Ramsar Convention. The largest lake in the country with an area of 456 km² at an elevation of 751.20 m, Lake Alaotra is surrounded by marshland (320 km²) and marshy savannah (210 km²) (Ferry et al., 2009) . The plains around the lake basin (820 km²) and in some twenty adjacent valleys laid out like spokes around the plains are used mainly for paddy rice (Figure 1 ).
The region gained its status of rice granary little by little during the twentieth century, first with impetus from the French colonial administration with, in particular, the implementation of various modern hydro-agricultural facilities (main canals, drains, diversion intakes and storage dams) in the 1950s, following "Operation Lake Alaotra » (Garin, 1998 figure 1 are the direct inheritors of the AMVR. In contrast, the other rice areas were not managed by the SOMALAC but were supervised loosely by the Rural Engineering administration (Génie rural) (Bouderbala et al., 1992) . Little development was done and they have conserved their 'traditional' character. The SOMALAC had three key tasks in the AMVR: the intensification of rice growing, land consolidation and finishing touches to the hydro-agricultural projects started during the colonial period (Lapierre, 1964; Société Centrale pour l'Equipement du 7 Territoire, 1965) . Although the SOMALAC's position, and hence that of the state, was central to the management of the large irrigated perimeters and the rice sector, difficulties increased after 1972 and continued until 1982 in the twin context of a socialist revolution and the disorganisation of the administration, with the degradation of hydro-agricultural infrastructure and the development of a black market running parallel to the state monopoly instituted for rice at Lake Alaotra in 1971 (Droy, 1998; Rakoto Ramiarantsoa, 1985) . In the mid-1980s, within the framework of rehabilitation projects under the aegis of the World Bank (Banque mondiale, 1992) and in the context of an international trend aimed at state withdrawal in the management of large water facilities (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Turral, 1995; Turral et al., 2010) , the rice sector was liberalised (in 1986 in the region of the lake), and perimeter management was decentralised and entrusted to Water Users Associations (Broutin et al., 2011) . The perimeter has an area of 4000 hectares and is divided into two ensembles. Upstream, the left bank of the Marianina Valley (1100 ha) was incorporated in the irrigation network at a late date: it was only connected to supply from the Bevava in 1993 when the Main Left Bank Canal (Canal Principal de Rive Gauche -CPRG) was built.
Historically, the valley is outside the SOMALAC intervention zone and is thus still marked today by traditional development works (non-hierarchic irrigation networks, canals dug by the farmers). Downstream, PC15 occupies 3000 ha in one of the large plains around the lake;
it was the pride of the old SOMALAC, with relatively modern hydro-agricultural 8 developments and regular, hierarchic water distribution. Each secondary canal thus feeds a hydraulic grid and each tertiary canal feeds a lot (BRL-Madagascar, 2008) . The nomenclature used in the study to refer to the various components of the perimeter are summarised in (Garin, 1998) .
After independence, the government of Madagascar promoted a family farm model, specifically in the lake region. The model, created from nothing, aimed at fostering the emergence of social development suitable for the intensification of rice growing. It consisted of a standard farm under owner occupancy with 5 workers cultivating 5 ha of rice with yields in excess of 3 t/ha (Teyssier, 1994) . This model was used within the framework of land consolidation implemented by the SOMALAC within the limits of the AMVR (Rural Development Area). The latter includes the PCs (renamed Périmètres de Culture) that had benefited from hydro-agricultural development works, including PC15. In contrast, no land redevelopment was performed in the old RIs like the Marianina Valley and that were outside the AMVR. Redevelopment was performed in two stages in the mid-1960s. Within the AMVR, the land belonging to owners already settled, with a paper title or common law ownership, was consolidated, mainly by compulsory purchase. In exchange, the owners received a lot of between 5 and 20 ha according to the size of their former holding and their former income (consolidated land). The remaining area was distributed as 3 to 5-ha lots to landless farmers (allocated land) (Bouderbala et al., 1992; Erismann, 2014; Garin, 1998; Louzoun, 1967) . After land consolidation and allocation, non owner farming was forbidden by SOMALAC regulations and by the law-share-cropping became illegal in 1975 (Droy, 1998) . Similarly, the division and sale of lots were forbidden. There must be just one owneroperator for each lot. However, it can be seen that the model has weakened. Today, lots have been divided into numerous plots and indirect farming has never disappeared from the 11 perimeters. As an example, the upstream part of PC15 is shown in figure 3 with the many changes in plot layout in the perimeter over the last 50 years. 
Methodology
In addition to bibliographical material, research was based mainly on the gathering and processing of the plot inventories for perimeter PC15 (Marianina Valley) to show the present state and historical dynamics of the plot layout.
The processing of the plot inventories available from 1970 to 2012
These 
A global and local analysis of holding and plot trends in the PC15-Marianina
Valley perimeter
The inventories were processed for two purposes. This general analysis was then overlaid by a detailed study of grid 21. First; analysis of landholding history was conducted for the ten largest (in area) landowners in PC15 that are now sited in grid 21 3 . Second, a typology of agrarian evolution of the lots was drawn up for the grid. Grid 21 is particularly suitable for this. It displays a broad range of landholding situations and is also rich in terms of political and sociological issues. It has to handle first recurrent difficulties in institutional management, especially in the collection of charges, and second the strong influence of the inheritors of consolidated land as they are historically against any collective management of irrigation (Ratsimba, 2007) . Interpretation of the results is based in particular on previous studies with more qualitative approaches (BlancPamard, 1987; Brochoire, 2009; Garin, 1998; Ratsimba, 2007) , but also on interviews of ricecroppers, technicians, and managers of the federation.
Methodology limits: the coexistence of legal and customary land law and the difficulty to assess property rights in Madagascar
Results may finally be misinterpreted if the limits of the inventories are not clearly understood. The latter needed corrections of typing and spelling mistakes (the same name may be spelled in different ways in different inventories but clearly refer to the same person or the same family) in order to follow the histories of the various owners and plots in time.
However, due to the very large quantity of information involved, with several thousand plots to cover and describe for each inventory, these corrections could not be systematic except for grid 21.
14 Assessing the property rights in the perimeter remains then the greatest challenge. In Madagascar, land may be owned through customary rights (lex fori) or positive laws (lex loci) (Evers et al., 2013) . Official land registration through property titling coexists with customary rights: the latter is based on the belief in the absolute right of the first cultivator of a land and his descendants called 'tompon-tany', masters of the land (Evers, 2005 (Evers, , 2006 ).
Inheritance appears here as the most legitimate mean to keep a land. Moreover, rather than titling a property, or noticing state land administration of a transfer of property (by sale or inheritance), owners prefer using the system of 'petits papiers' (little documents): these are informal land documents 'authenticated' by the stamp of a local authority (Teyssier et al., 2008) . Land titling is indeed too long (6 years), too costly, and associated from the point of view of the owners to land taxes. Since 2005, a decentralised landholding security policy made official this system of 'petits papiers', by allowing communes to deliver landholding certificates that are much cheaper and quicker to obtain for the ricegrowers than property titles (Burnod et al., 2012; Rochegude, 2012; Muttenzer, 2010; Teyssier et al., 2009) .
Inside the PCs, thanks to the land consolidation led in the 1960s, land titling is much more widespread than in the rest of the island (Jacoby, 2007) : ricegrowers have formal titles in about half of the land, and more than 60% for the sole PC15, broadly above the national figure (7% of the cultivated area is titled on a national scale). Nonetheless, these titles are generally not up to date, and issuance of titles has been steeply decreasing after the end of SOMALAC (Penot et al., 2014) . In the perimeter and sometimes in the very same plots, may then coexist customary, certified and titled properties. The inventories available actually refer to the owners who are identified as such by the technicians of the federation, and expected to pay the water fee. Land titles and certificates are thus not taken into consideration. Due to this difficulty to assess land properties, the inventories cannot be exhaustive: certain owners may not be clearly identified, due to their absence when the censuses are carried out: 'bad payers' in particular are reluctant for their plots (with the water fee due) to be counted.
Results and Discussion.
The results of the study are examined in two parts. First of all, PC23 is clearly different to PC15-Marianina Valley. It is markedly fragmented with average plot size of 2.58 ha per plot with only just 35% of plots of 1 ha or less. It also has many large holdings (holdings of 5 ha account for more than a third of the total area) and very few small holdings (9% of the area consists of holdings of 1 ha or less).
Rice growers consider PC23 to be fairly unattractive for reasons of poor water management and extremely low yields. These features save the perimeter from fragmentation and account for the maintaining of a significant number of large and medium-sized holdings.
In contrast, PC15 is both fragmented-average plot size 0.9 ha and half of the plots being 0.5 ha or less-and marked by the small number of large holdings (9% of the area of PC15 is accounted for by holdings with an area of 5 ha or more in comparison with a third of the total consisting of holdings of 1 ha and less) because of very strong pressure on landholding.
Finally, Marianina Valley is both very strongly fragmented (average plot size 0.7 ha) and displays considerable differences in holdings. The valley has both numerous small holdings (a third of the area is accounted for by holdings of 1 ha or less) and powerful large holdings (holdings of 10 ha or more account for 11% of the area of the valley and those of 5 ha account for 22%). The reason is Marianina Valley's former status of Réserve Indigène, which involves two considerations. First, it was a reserve and concessions (property titles)
were awarded during the colonial period. Although the European concessions were nationalised and redistributed in 1973, those awarded to Madagascans remained intact.
Second, the reserves were peopled to a considerably extent by Sihanakas or former Merina migrants integrated in Sihanaka society, whereas the new migrants tended to settle in the PCs (Garin, 1998) ; however, Sihanaka social structure is very divided, ranging from large landholders who use landless sharecropper and small landholders scattered over the very fragmented plot layout.
The failure of the family farm model and landholding convergence between PC15 and Marianina Valley: non-owner occupancy and hyper-fragmentation
Despite land consolidation, PC15 experienced an exponential growth of the number of farmers, resulting in two features: hyper-fragmentation and the development of nonowner occupancy. Due to the failure of the family farming model promoted by the SOMALAC, PC15 have become relatively similar to Marianina Valley in its plot structure.
Non-owner occupancy (leasing and share-cropping) was forbidden after land consolidation. However, it appeared suddenly at the end of the 1980s under effect of internal immigration (new arrivals after consolidation found it difficult to acquire land in PC15) and the liberalisation of the economy from 1984 -1986 onwards. In 1980 -1981 occupancy still concerned 80% of farmers in PC15 villages in comparison with 65% in Marianina Valley, in 1993 owner occupancy was down to 69% in PC15 but was still the same in Marianina Valley (Garin, 1998) . The trend has been stable since then: 37% of the plots in PC15 are under owner occupancy and 41% in Marianina Valley. As a comparison, the proportion does not exceed 28% in PC23 (Table 2) , 25% of lowlands in the lake Alaotra area and 10% of lowlands on a national scale (Jacoby, 2007) . However, two objections can be made to these figures. Firstly, one form of semi-share-cropping involving occasional work carried out by landless share-croppers on holdings belonging to large Sihanaka owners in exchange for cash loans, rice or equipment is too informal and volatile to be taken into account in the inventories (Charmes, 1973 (Charmes, , 1975 . Secondly, slight variations in occupation status from one year to the next can be seen during the period examined (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) : from 29% in 2008 and 35-37% in the other seasons in PC15 and between 36% and 44% in Marianina Valley. These variations seem to be correlated partially with fluctuations in paddy production: after a good harvest the owner cultivates his plot himself but not after a mediocre harvest, according to Blanc-Pamard (1987) .
Although the development of non-owner occupancy was very sudden in PC15, fragmentation has been an underlying feature: average plot area decreased gradually from Secondly, the increase in the number of micro-holdings contrasts with the maintaining of the largest ones, mainly in the Marianina Valley. Inequality in landholding between large landowners and small operators (small owner farmers or landless sharecroppers) is therefore increasingly marked. Figure 9 highlights the significant decrease in the area of large and medium-sized holdings in PC15 and, in contrast, the very measured decrease in the Marianina Valley.
In PC15, the decrease in medium-sized holdings (3 ha and more) was already strongly Here, the large holdings were originally colonial concessions and have now become undivided holdings belonging to all the inheritors of the initial purchase and management is handled by two or three of their representatives. The latter pay an annual lump sum tribute to the rest of the family, who live in Antananarivo or abroad. These large holdings give 26 evidence of the rights traditionally recognized to the descendants of first comers (Evers, 2006 (Evers, , 2005 . On a local scale, PC15 and Marianina Valley benefit from one of the best irrigation systems in lake Alaotra region, leading to paddy yields superior to 4 tons per hectare (at a national level, yields are about 2.5 tons per hectare) (Fujiki, 2013) . The perimeter appears then attractive to migrants. This phenomenon is aggravated by the practice of inheritance in equal shares, customary among the farmers in the region (Brochoire, 2009) The analysis below for grid 21, a large hydraulic grid in the downstream part of PC15, is aimed firstly at identifying the land acquisition strategies used by certain large landowners and secondly at drawing up a typology of lots' evolutions.
The territorial strategies of large landowners: conservation of a landholding heritage and purchase of land
In PC15, against the general trend for a reduction in the size of holdings, middle class urban newcomers (from outside the perimeter) and large landowners are succeeding in purchasing land to increase the size of their holdings. However, the land grabbing dynamics that can be seen in the perimeter are of local-scale. They do not involve large scale acquisitions by foreign agro-business investment, like Daewoo's cancelled project aiming at purchasing 1,300,000 ha of land (Burnod et al., 2013; Evers et al., 2011) . They do not involve either environmentalists' pressures as observed otherwise in Madagascar (Seagle, 2012) , even though PC15 is included into the lake Alaotra area protected by the Ramsar convention.
It is to be noted here that the lake Alaotra area is notable for the extent of land market activity. Nationally only 13% of lowland plots (mostly paddy fields) in rural areas are purchased, against 40% in the lake Alaotra region (Jacoby, 2007) . PC15 appears to be in between (Brochoire, 2009) , with a land market a bit less open than in the rest of the area due to the strong pressure on land and the number of titled properties -the latter indeed are less subject to sales, according to Jacoby (2007) . Sales mainly concern the southern part of the perimeter where there is slightly less saturation and less property titling.
Purchasers in PC15 may be native from the region or be migrants coming from the national capital Antananarivo or from Antsirabe. The newcomers settle in lake Alaotra region to make their fortune with a start-up capital -they are not strictly ricegrowers but also have other complementary activities such as transport business or large dairy cattle breeding.
Purchasers have two main buying strategies. First, they may use the 'vary maitso' (green rice system). This consists of lending money to rice growers in difficulty between harvests and, after the harvest, taking repayment in paddy rice at a third of the market price. They use this system of usury to build up capital that they invest in land. These buyers concentrate on small ricegrowers who are in debt and who prefer to sell their assets rather than be liable to seizure. Those small ricegrowers keep the remaining proceeds of the sale to buy cheaper land downstream of the perimeter near the marshes. A second buying strategy aims at leasing for several years a land from a small owner in financial difficulty. After several years of renewable leasing (or sharecropping) agreements, the owner generally decides to sale its land to its tenant. This is an example of reverse tenancy, when the landlord appears to be poorer than its tenant. This trend has already been observed in lake Alaotra region by Bellemare (2009) .
Examination of the histories of the ten largest landowners currently established in grid 21 (summarised in Table 3 ) highlights these purchase strategies. In addition, the table shows the history of five other ricegrowers outside grid 21; one of them (Rak.) own the largest lot in grid 15, as can be seen clearly in figure 6 . Study of the ten owners in grid 21
show their specific features and also echo the overall dynamics described above, providing a key to understanding them:
(1) Whereas the overall area of their holdings in PC15 as a whole tended to grow, increasing from an average of 5.2 ha in 2000 to 7.4 ha in 2012 (Table 3) , the number of lots occupied by these owners increased from an average of 1.9 to 3.9 during the same period. In fact these growing estates are scattered and, seemingly paradoxically, contribute to fragmentation. This trend seen in PC15
contrasts with that observed in the Marianina Valley where block holdings that 30 were former colonial concessions are dominant. Indeed, the spatial inertia of large estates is comparatively smaller in PC15.
(2) Actively involved in ricegrowing in the perimeter, nine out of ten (the exception being Ral.) of these large landowners cultivate their rice fields on an owner occupancy basis. Three ricegrowers who are not from grid 21 (Jean R., JeanBaptiste R. and Albert R.) became incorporated in the grid initially as ordinary farmers before purchasing various plots in some of the most fragmented lots. The most recent purchasers favour owner occupancy in order to guarantee their land rights and to limit the risk of dubious advantages being taken by tenants. This is a serious risk in the Lake Alaotra region and may be a reason among others for the stabilisation of owner occupancy in PC15 during the last 15 years. 
Typology of lots' trends
Beyond the general trends already described for the perimeter, the evolution of plot layout involved many factors at lot scale. The lots in grid 21 were classified using a typology with two entries-cohesion of the lot and evolution of the ownership to illustrate plot dynamics and the distribution of holdings. Lot cohesion was evaluated for 2012 using two criteria: the presence of one or several owners in the lot and owner or non-owner occupancy. The five inventories available (1970, 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2012) Transfers by purchase seem more frequent in this category, as do owners from towns. In grid 21 as a whole, owners include persons from town in nine lots and five of these are considered as being precarious. The owners are generally from Ambatondrazaka, except in one case where they are from the capital Antananarivo (lot 2147).
Finally, it is interesting to note that from the spatial point of view the most stable lots are close to canal I8, whereas the most precarious ones are adjacent to drain D8 (Figure 2 ).
The rice fields closest to the irrigation canals are also those that receive more regular irrigation and so the yields are more stable, in contrast with the rice fields close to the drains (Fujiki, 2013) . Land considered as being the least productive will thus be sold more readily.
Technical disparities therefore appear to be a key factor in landholding inequality and the geographic distribution of such inequality.
Lot cohesion (2012) Ownership dynamics (1970, 2000, 2003, 2008, 2012) To conclude, analysis of grid 21 shows the dynamics at the scale of PC15. Firstly, inequality is increasing between the great majority of ricegrowers whose holding size decreases from one generation to the next and, in the most extreme cases, from one poor season to another, and a few landowners who succeed in increasing their holdings by using an active land grabbing strategy. Secondly, although trends in land ownership transfer move overall towards the division of lots, they also and above all reveal the increasing instability weighing on the status of some landowners. 
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Conclusion
Analysis of landholding dynamics at perimeter scale shows a trend for fragmentation and even hyper-fragmentation and a decrease in the size of holdings. However, there are strong disparities between the Marianina Valley, where large holdings with more than 5 hectares of land remain solidly established and maintain strong spatial cohesion, and PC15
which features the generalised division of holdings and a spatial dispersion of the largest.
The dynamics identified at the scale of the perimeter result in a host of situations at more local scales. The fragmentation of lots leads to instability of plot structure and also to greater agrarian precariousness and incertitude with regard to the status of owners and operators. Property transfers accelerate, as does the turnover in operators. Such instability is an opportunity for the wealthiest and most enterprising ricecroppers to implement land grabbing strategies by profiting from the fragility and difficulties of the majority. The landholding structure of PC15 has become flexible, featuring socio-spatial contradictions that become more marked every year, with exaggerated differences in wealth, dynamics and strategies. Far from being uniform, the perimeter area is made up of a patchwork of plots and holdings whose boundaries are changing more and more rapidly.
Consequences of land fragmentation and land grabbing may be observed on different levels. On a global level, fragmentation has got implications on population poverty, as already observed in other parts in the country. Poverty is indeed strongly correlated with holding and plot size, the poorest groups having the least lands (Stifel, 2010) . If average holding size in Madagascar lies around 0.8 ha, poorest households only have an average of 0.5 ha against 1.8 ha for the wealthiest (USAID, 2010) . Land fragmentation appears then fundamentally as a social problem, in the perimeter as in the rest of Madagascar.
On a local level, these landholding upsets have an impact on the collective management of the perimeter and especially the hydraulic aspect. As has already been noted, the lot is the basic unit of the land redevelopment performed in the 1960s, but it is also the hydraulic unit in PC15. The hydraulic network was originally laid out to supply entire lots. The more a lot is divided, the more complicated the water distribution to the various fields. Fragmentation implies technical problems (how can all the plots in the same lot be irrigated?) that result in informal solutions (small farm channels are dug, frequently wasteful cascade irrigation is used) and also problems of relations between people. Fragmentation results in competition for access to the irrigation network between the different operators in the same lot. Under such conditions, the common interest of the different ricecroppers risks to be called into question, putting finally at stake the sustainability of the network.
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